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Headquarters, Joint Task Force SEVEN  
J-3 Division  
ORIENTATION GUIDE

PART I

GENERAL BACKGROUND  
INFORMATION

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## ORIENTATION GUIDE

### PART 1

#### HISTORY OF THE MARSHALL ISLANDS

The Marshall Islands are a group of two chains of islands, the RADAK and RALIK, encompassing thirty two atolls and various separate islands. The inhabitants are Micronesians. The islands were probably the last stop on the route which the Polynesians took on their Eastward migration from Indonesia. Similarities between Micronesian and Polynesian culture and physical type suggest that the Marshallese formed a part of this movement.

For recorded history, the islands were first sighted in 1526 by the Spaniard, Garcia de Loyasa. For the remainder of the sixteenth century various ship's captains in Spanish vessels sighted and reported nearly half of the atolls in the archipelago, but left very inaccurate charts of them. Then for nearly two centuries the islands were virtually lost to the western world. Credit for rediscovery is usually given to the English Captains Gilbert and Marshall who in 1788 sighted many islands in the easternmost chain. For the next one hundred years various explorers sighted additional islands in the group and reported them for historical record.

The first systematic exploration of the islands was made by Kotzebue, a lieutenant of the Russian Navy. On a scientific expedition to the northwest coast of North America in 1817 Kotzebue stopped at the islands. He made the first accurate hydrographic reports as well as the first detailed descriptions of the flora, fauna, and people. Because of the altercations which arose when a sequence of whaling vessels touched at the islands the inhabitants became wrathful and savage. Several ships were later attacked and looted and some of the crew members killed.

Before the Marshalls were annexed by the Germans in 1885, the islands were ruled by local clan chiefs, each struggling by war and intrigue to extend his domain at the expense of his neighbors. In most instances these conflicts were petty, involving only a single atoll or a few adjacent ones, but occasionally an aggressive chief would succeed in dominating most of the atolls of either the western or eastern chain.

Germany, eager for colonial expansion in the Pacific, saw an opportunity in the Marshall Islands, to which no other western power had asserted a substantial claim. The local treaty of 1878 was therefore followed by the formal assumption of a protectorate over the archipelago in 1885 when the commander of a German warship ceremonially raised the German flag on some of the principal islands. The German administrators attempted to maintain the native political structure by dealing with the local chiefs.

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Despite this policy, native political structure changed considerably during the German regime. German policy with respect to the Marshall Islands was primarily

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that of gaining and developing colonies which might prove economically profitable.

When the war in Europe commenced in 1914, the Japanese took military possession of the Marshalls interning the German administrators and businessmen and eventually shipping them back to Germany. The islands were administered by a Japanese naval garrison stationed on Jaluit until 1918 when a civil department of the naval administration was created.

When the peace conference at Versailles came to deliberate the disposition of the former German possessions in the Pacific, it was faced with a delicate situation in consequence of a secret agreement made in 1917 between Great Britain and Japan. This agreement assigned to the Japanese all former German possessions north of the Equator, including the Marshall Islands, and the British those south of the Equator. With annexation in accordance with this agreement already virtually accomplished, the peace conference was powerless to effect any significant change.

After considerable discussion and compromise, however, it was able to bring the disposition of the German Pacific possessions under the mandate system by devising a special category of Class C mandates. Such a mandate differed from outright annexation only by imposing upon the mandatory power a number of obligations; notably, to promote the material and moral well-being and social progress of the Marshallese, to prohibit slavery and forced labor, to control traffic in arms, to exclude alcoholic beverages, to refrain from building fortifications and military bases, to permit freedom of worship and missionary activity, and to submit an annual report to the League of Nations.

On these terms Japan was confirmed, in 1920, in her possession of the Marshall Islands as well as the Carolines and the Marianas. In 1922 the United States accepted the arrangement in a special agreement with Japan who then set up a government consistent with the terms of the mandate to administer the former German Islands north of the equator.

The Marshall Islands were little noticed by the outside world until 1932 when rumors gained currency that Japan was fortifying the islands. This led the League to question the accredited representative of the Japanese government who categorically denied the reports. Although his word was accepted by some, enough skepticism remained to cause recurrent comments in the press and diplomatic circles up to the outbreak of war in December, 1941.

Kwajalein and Eniwetok were the atolls most heavily fortified by the Japanese, and were selected as primary targets for United States attack in the march across the Pacific to Japan. Bikini, for instance, had only six Japanese soldiers stationed on it and all six were killed by the intense naval and air bombardment which began on 1 January 1944. Kwajalein was assaulted on 1 February 1944 and was in American hands a few days later.

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D-Day was set for Eniwetok Atoll as 17 February 1944. Rear Admiral Hill, Commander of Attack Group 51.2, USN, was in command of the operation. The major ground forces under his command were the Army's 106th Infantry Regiment, the Fifth

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Amphibious Corps Reconnaissance Company, and the Marine's 22nd Infantry Regiment. On the morning of 17 February the task force moved into the lagoon and launched a concentrated bombardment, correlated with air strikes.

The first phase of the landings occurred without incident, and two batteries of field artillery soon began to deliver fire on Engebi. Two battalions of marines landed on Engebi in the morning hours of 18 February, and overcame resistance quickly. By 1600 hours on that date the island was reported secure. Although ferocious, Japanese resistance on the island showed obvious lack of preparation. Statements of prisoners indicated that half of the defenders were killed or wounded by preparatory fires.

Eniwetok Island was assaulted the morning of 19 February 1944. Preparations for meeting the attack were much more effective and it was not until the evening of the 21st that the island was secured. The 106th Regiment and the 3rd Battalion of the 22nd Regiment were employed in the capture of this island.

The comparatively heavy resistance on Eniwetok Island resulted in decision to delay the attack on Parry Island until reorganization could be effected. This was accomplished in time to order an attack on Parry in the morning of the 22nd. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the Marines were selected to make the assault. Initial progress was excellent, and by 1315 hours the northern half of the island was ours. At 1330 a coordinated attack was launched against more determined resistance. At 1924 the island was declared secure, but mopping up operations continued until 1000 hours the following morning. Meanwhile, virtually unopposed landings were made on other smaller islands. By evening of the 23rd, Eniwetok Atoll was ours.

A total of 169 Americans were killed, 521 wounded and 26 missing. The Japanese suffered 2,661 killed and only 41 taken as prisoners.

The Marshalls are now a strategic area Trusteeship administered by the United States in accordance with a Trusteeship Agreement between the United Nations Security Council and U. S. Government. This agreement was approved by the United Nations Security Council April 2, 1947, and ratified by the U. S. Government July 18, 1947.

Eniwetok and Bikini Atolls are therefore part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. They are subject to the full power of administration, legislation and jurisdiction of the United States. The territory agreement for the Trust Territory permits the United States to possess any of the areas for security reasons.

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### HISTORY OF OVERSEAS ATOMIC TESTS

Of the twelve test operations conducted by the United States since the TRINITY at Alamogordo, New Mexico in 1945, seven have been conducted in the Pacific. Operation TRINITY proved that an implosion type weapon would work but there was no information as to the effects of atomic weapons. Therefore, Operation CROSSROADS was conducted by Joint Task Force ONE under the command of Vice Admiral H. P. Blandy in July 1946. The main purpose of this operation was twofold; first, to test the effects of an air delivered atomic burst upon an array of ships, and second, to ascertain the results of an effect from an underwater burst.

Operation SANDSTONE followed in 1948. It marked a departure from the CROSSROAD's experience in that the two major agencies of the government, the Department of Defense (then known as the National Military Establishment) and the Atomic Energy Commission, merged into one common effort. However, there were several points of similarity. First, the two operations were conducted in the same general area. Second, the transportation and assembly of the bombs used was accomplished in a sea-plane tender which had been modified for this purpose. Third, the logistic support of the technical operations carried out in a remote tropical setting was similar. The two operations differed in that the atomic bombs used on CROSSROADS were of the original FATMAN design whereas in SANDSTONE no experimental designs were used.

Pressure of time imposed a tremendous weight upon Operation SANDSTONE from the moment of its conception on 3 April 1947 until its consummation. It must be remembered that no precedent had been established for the conduct of tests. The good relationships existing between the various agencies today can be attributed directly to the cautious planning of this operation. It all began when the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission requested assistance from the Armed Forces in the conduct of this operation. Specifically, assistance was requested for the recommendations of a test site, the designation of a planning group or a Commander within the Armed Forces with whom plans could be made, and the readying of military and civilian units to assist in the conduct of the Operation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff on 10 September 1947 approved the formation of a Joint Organization to provide military participants in the operation. They further approved the recommendation that a commander of the Joint Organization be designated and, in addition, that a deputy from each of the other components of the Armed Forces be designated. Thus, the office of deputies in our organization today was ushered into existence.

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Pending the formation of the actual Joint Organization, however, the Commander and deputies were to serve as a committee called Joint Proof Test Committee (JPTC). The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that pending the organization of the Task Force, the JPTC would delineate the organization of the Joint Task Force, outline the participation of the several components of the Armed Forces, and outline the recommended action on all aspects of the test which were of concern to the Armed Forces.

The organization was activated 18 October 1947. It was originally designated Joint Task Force SWITCHMEN and later changed to Joint Task Force SEVEN. It was considered undesirable from a security standpoint to designate the task force Joint Task Force TWO since it would be reminiscent of Joint Task Force ONE. The number SEVEN was a low number, was distinctive, and was eventually selected.

From the date of its formal activation until 8 March 1948, Joint Task Force SEVEN maintained two headquarters, Joint Task Force MAIN at Washington and Joint Task Force FORWARD at Fort Shafter. On 15 February 1948 the two headquarters were switched and Joint Task Force MAIN opened at Fort Shafter while the echelon in Washington became Joint Task Force REAR. Finally, on 8 March 1948, the headquarters was organized into three echelons, Joint Task Force MAIN, opened aboard the USS MT MCKINLEY and remained there until the close of the operation, Joint Task Force SEVEN, Oahu echelon, and Joint Task Force REAR. Unlike the smooth organization we enjoy today, seven subordinate commands were organized within the task force. Task Group 7.1 was designated to direct the technical and scientific tests. Task Group 7.2 was charged with responsibility for construction at the Eniwetok Test Site and with the military security of the atoll. Task Group 7.3 was charged with the responsibility for the security of the atoll against surface submarine or air attack and the operation of all naval forces of the task force. Task Group 7.4 was responsible for (1) collection of air samples through the operation of drone aircraft passing through atomic clouds and (2) operation of aircraft on long range weather reconnaissance, inter-island air transportation and the operation of the Eniwetok Airport. Task Group 7.5 was the security group charged with the responsibility for safeguarding documents and material on shore which were classified Restricted Data. Task Group 7.6 was the Joint Radiological Safety Group responsible for the operational detection and determination of types and intensities of radioactivity.

It was soon realized that if full use was to be made by the laboratories of the data acquired from Operation SANDSTONE, it was necessary to establish within its organization a permanent division for the testing of atomic weapons. The glare and thunder of the 1948 tests had scarcely died away before Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory was anticipating the 1951 experiments, Operation GREENHOUSE. Consequently, in July 1948 J-Division was created to meet the needs of the quickened tempo of experimentation. By the late summer of 1948 there had developed a relatively firm philosophy of organization as well as a tests program. Plans called for the detonation of weapon prototypes conducted along the general lines of SANDSTONE but with a task force of two separate units, civilian and military, with sharply divided

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responsibilities and with the radiological safety section under the scientific director rather than the task force commander. This divided command could not last for long and today we find the radiological safety as an integral unit of the J-3 Division. The general scheme was sufficiently well advanced by the end of the summer to begin negotiations through the Albuquerque Operations Office (then known as the Santa Fe Operations Office) with the engineering firm of Holmes and Narver, Los Angeles, California, to establish permanent testing and operational facilities at Eniwetok. Negotiations were also begun with Edgerton, Germeshausen and Grier, Inc. Boston, Massachusetts, for technical photography and visible radiation measurements, and with the Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, D.C., for measurement of thermal radiation, transit time and gamma rays. It was determined to have a garrison of approximately 100 men drawn from the U. S. Army stationed on the Atoll to safeguard and maintain facilities.

Operation CROSSROADS had been under Navy command, and SANDSTONE under Army command. It was therefore, logical for the 1951 tests to be under the Air Force. This rotation of the command among the three services soon became a major policy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in assigning commanders for overseas tests. The Joint Proof Test Committee was organized once again to determine the organization of the Joint Task Force, to outline participation by the Armed Forces in the 1951 tests, and to recommend action on all aspects of the operation which concerned the three services. The JPTC drafted the organization of the task force based upon a philosophy of quadripartite participation. It was desired to have an integrated staff directing operations which would best consider the nation's welfare while serving the interest of both the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission. Therefore, the scientific deputy, although civilian, was placed on the same level and within the same organization block occupied by the military deputies. The principal of quadripartite participation was followed throughout the organization designated as Joint Task Force THREE. In addition, it was decided to assign Army, Navy, Air Force and Atomic Energy Commission personnel without discrimination to the four J-Divisions of the headquarters. Four subordinate task groups were also organized known as 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 to represent AEC, Army, Navy, and Air Force activities respectively. The scientific group, 3.1, was intended to consist of scientific and technical personnel requirements to conduct program experiments requested by the Atomic Energy Commission and the three military departments.

With the termination of GREENHOUSE operations at the Eniwetok Atoll in the late spring of '51 most of the participating personnel had returned to their various laboratories, agencies and military establishment throughout the United States where the results of the experiments began to receive assessment and documentation in the effort to integrate the newly gained knowledge into the overall pattern of atomic progress.

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The recognition within the Department of Defense for the need of a new joint task force for the execution of another operation at Eniwetok subsequent to GREENHOUSE became fairly firm in April 1951. In accordance with the Joint Chiefs of Staff desires, CNO wrote a letter in May to CINCPAC outlining his responsibilities in connection with Eniwetok Atoll and the roll up of Joint Task Force THREE operations. This letter directed CINCPAC to assume, at a date mutually agreeable to himself and CJTF THREE, the responsibility for the military security of Eniwetok Atoll. The letter further informed him that the senior unit commander of Joint Task Force THREE remaining in the atoll would be designated atoll commander (ATCOM) and would in that capacity report to CINCPAC for area security, movement control of aircraft and vessels, and logistical support. At such time as the activation of the new Joint Task Force which was to succeed Joint Task Force THREE the new commander, Joint Task Force would, when present in the Eniwetok area, automatically become the atoll commander. However, during his absence the command would revert again to the senior task force unit commander present in the atoll. This arrangement remained in effect until 1 December 1956 when ATCOM was disestablished and the commander of the Joint Task Force assumed these responsibilities.

On 15 November 1951, the office of Field Manager, Eniwetok Proving Ground was established by the Albuquerque Operations Office, AEC. In general, the Field Manager was to be responsible and would report to the Manager, Albuquerque Operations Office on all matters relative to the performance of the activities of the contractors at the Pacific Proving Ground and for planning and executing a comprehensive program for the design of technical and other project facilities. Additionally, he was authorized and directed to administer the functions assigned to the Atomic Energy Commission at the Eniwetok Proving Ground. In connection with the military he was assigned the responsibility for maintaining liaison with the Joint Task Force and of providing necessary services and support in the proving ground. With the establishment of this new office, both the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense had reached a working solution governing future policy in the build-up phase for atomic tests conducted at Eniwetok.

Scarcely before this vast reporting of Operation GREENHOUSE was thoroughly underway, a new task force, Joint Task Force 132 had been activated in anticipation of the next series of tests at Eniwetok, Operation IVY. Organizationally, the task force was typical of those conducting earlier overseas atomic operations in that it had been administered from a joint headquarters and was composed not only of military personnel but of personnel from the Atomic Energy Commission and its various contractors. Specifically, Joint Task Force 132 was organized internally into a headquarters and four subordinate task groups; a scientific task group; an Army task group; a Navy task group, and an Air Force Task Group.

Operation CASTLE conducted in 1954 was in almost every sense of the word an extension of Operation IVY. Except for the establishment of Joint Task Force SEVEN as a permanent organization and the formation of a fifth task group very few changes occurred between the two tests which were separated only by a period of about

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14 months. CASTLE would normally have become a Navy responsibility, however, because of the existing plans for an underwater operation it was felt that the Chief of Naval Operations might well prefer the executiveship of that operation to CASTLE. For this reason and because of the closeness of the two operational dates, a JCS decision was reached to extend the JTF mission for IVY to include CASTLE and retain the same commander. The Joint Task Force was redesignated as JTF SEVEN.

With the advancement into the thermonuclear field, real estate at Eniwetok became a paramount consideration for all future planning. The complete elimination of EUGELAB Island on Operation IVY more than justified the concern of all. On 12 September 1952, the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory presented to the Atomic Energy Commission a formal justification for the use of Bikini as a supplement to Eniwetok. With AEC's subsequent approval, Bikini thus entered into the planning phase for an operation for the first time since CROSSROADS.

In the middle of Operation CASTLE the Atomic Energy Commission proposed to the Commander of the Joint Task Force the establishment of a fifth task group to be composed principally of personnel from the Eniwetok field office. It was proposed that no military personnel were to be assigned to the new task group. In addition the task force commander during the on-site phase would control and direct this group. The JTF Commander offered no objections and Task Group 7.5 was activated in March 1953.

Operation WIGWAM conducted in 1955 offered nothing new in the development of policy or organization in the execution of atomic tests outside the Zone of Interior. The executive agent passed to the Chief of Naval Operations and Task Group 7.3, the naval task group, carried out the operation.

The Navy Department also retained control of Joint Task Force SEVEN during Operation REDWING conducted in the Spring and Summer of 1956. In the planning phase for this operation the role of AFSWP within the organization of the Joint Task Force came into sharp focus. By agreement between the Commander, Joint Task Force SEVEN and the Chief, AFSWP, the Weapons Effects Test Division (WETD) a subordinate of Field Command, AFSWP located at Sandia Base, New Mexico, would submit its request for logistic support through Headquarters, AFSWP to this headquarters. Information copies of all such letters, however, would be forwarded to CTG 7.1, the Scientific Task Group. TG 7.1 could thus incorporate the items listed into the total requirement of the Scientific Task Group. Furthermore, it was agreed that if CTG 7.1 felt that some of these items should not be granted, he could write direct to this headquarters presenting his reasons.

TU-3 would be formed with WETD, Field Command, AFSWP, in Albuquerque, New Mexico. It would operate like a separate task group until it reported to CTG 7.1 at the Eniwetok Proving Ground. Technical matters and construction requirements

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would be coordinated with TG 7.1 during the build-up phase. This headquarters would be called upon to make decisions on matters of disagreement between WETD and TG 7.1 or other task groups. If any serious conflicts of interest arose, the recommendations of the DMA/AEC and the Chief, AFSWP might be requested, however, the final decision would remain with the Commander, Joint Task Force SEVEN. It was further agreed that AFSWP would designate an officer as deputy, CTG 7.1 when he arrived in the EPG just before the shot series. AFSWP would also nominate an officer to be AFSWP representative in Headquarters, Joint Task Force SEVEN. He should be given a position which would insure that he sits in policy conferences. He is thus normally assigned to the Command Division rather than to J-3 Division. Furthermore, AFSWP would appoint a CTU-3. He would report to CTG 7.1 at the EPG. The R&D funds allocated to carry out DOD projects would remain in AFSWP channels. WETD would give ALOO a large balance on which to draw in construction bunkers, etc; however, it would not order ALOO to build anything until TG 7.1 had coordinated.

An important development in the concept of operations of REDWING was the dual capability maintained throughout the operation of firing one shot on both atolls on the same day. This capability was limited to a combination of one large shot at Bikini and one small shot at Eniwetok. This concept became necessary because REDWING witnessed the largest number of nuclear detonations in the history of the United States. In order to complete the operation in an acceptable time it was necessary to take full advantage of weather conditions.

Operation HARDTACK appears to be even larger than REDWING and many new problems appear on the horizon which have not yet been resolved. For instance, as this paper goes to press the question of enlarging the proving ground to include Taongi Atoll has become paramount. Perhaps, by the time you read this, that particular problem will have been resolved but other equally important ones will have arisen. Their solution and the subsequent extension of this history will in part depend upon you as a member of the J-3 team.

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