

August 17, 1951

AEC 334/10

COPY NO. 21

ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

RESPONSIBILITIES ASSOCIATED WITH MAINTENANCE OF THE ENIWETOK PROVING GROUND AND ROLL-UP OF JTF-3

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Note by the Secretary

1. At Meeting 578 on July 12, 1951, after discussion of the responsibility for weapons testing programs and proving grounds, the Commission noted that an information paper would be prepared detailing joint and separate responsibilities of agencies associated with the maintenance of the Eniwetok Proving Grounds and the conduct of test operations, including the ownership of land and facilities and the budgeting for program activities.

2. Attached for the information of the Commission, in compliance with the above, is a report by the Director of Military Application on the general subject of joint and separate responsibilities associated with maintenance of the Eniwetok Proving Ground and Roll-up of Joint Task Force Three.

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RESPONSIBILITIES ASSOCIATED WITH THE MAINTENANCE OF
ENIWETOK PROVING GROUND AND CONDUCT OF FUTURE TEST OPERATIONS

Report by the Director of Military Application

THE PROBLEM

1. To review for the information of the Commission the agreements covering the joint and separate responsibilities associated with the maintenance of Eniwetok Proving Ground and conduct of future test operations.

BACKGROUND

2. Eniwetok Atoll was first used by the AEC as the location for Operation SANDSTONE in the spring of 1948. During preparations for SANDSTONE, it became apparent that the need for a weapons proving ground would continue with weapon development. Action was initiated at that time, therefore, to establish permanent facilities in, and to acquire firm control of, the area.

3. Following SANDSTONE, a 74-man garrison under control of CinCPac was left on the Atoll to maintain facilities between tests. The balance of personnel from JTF-7 (SANDSTONE Task Force), however, were reassigned, and with them was lost the only available military experience in the atomic weapons testing field. From the start of the build-up for GREENHOUSE, it was obvious that this release of experienced personnel was being paid for in lost time. The AEC, accordingly, recommended to the Department of Defense the establishment of a permanent test organization to conduct tests outside the United States. The Joint Chiefs of Staff decided, however, that successive Joint Task Forces for

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the conduct of overseas operations would be established as needed. Because of its method of implementation, this directive essentially satisfied the Commission's requirement for a continuing organization since it has materialized that succeeding Task Forces are to be activated prior to the deactivation of their predecessors so that they can be organized in the same form, occupy the same physical location, use the same files, and have many of the same personnel. In other words, there now exists a continuing frame of reference into which operational requirements addressed to the Department of Defense can be fitted for execution by experienced people in a proven location which has adequate facilities.

DISCUSSION

4. The operational phase of Operation GREENHOUSE was completed 25 May 1951, and the Commander, JTF-3, departed Eniwetok with many of his principal staff soon thereafter. This marked the beginning of the "roll-up" phase of Operation GREENHOUSE, target date for completion of which was set at 1 November 1951. During this phase, which is now in progress, such equipment as will remain unused until the next test must be moved to a central spot for storage and "mothballing" on Parry or Eniwetok Islands while immovable installations must be preserved in place. The remaining damaged test structures must be demolished for security or safety reasons. The garrison must gradually be reduced in size, and operations must be curtailed until, at the end of the roll-up, the organization is operating at a pace designed just to maintain installations and equipment at a standby level until the buildup for the next test begins.

5. Policy Agreements on Roll-Up: Basic assumptions as to division of responsibilities for roll-up were published in AEC

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334/4. These assumptions were amplified by a Joint Chiefs of Staff decision of April 13, 1951, (AEC 334/6), with which the AEC concurred (see AEC 334/7 and AEC 334/8). In addition, as suggested in a letter to the Military Liaison Committee, May 11, 1951, (AEC 334/7), conferences have been held and agreements reached at the SFO-JTF-3 level for maintenance on Eniwetok (see Appendix "A"). Current roll-up activities are proceeding in accordance with these agreements.

a. Ownership, and Responsibility for Maintenance, of Installations and Equipment: The basis for decision as to which agency was to pay for installations and equipment at the Atoll was established by Enclosure "M" to JCS 1998/13, November 25, 1949, (see Appendix "B") at Meeting 376 on March 1, 1950, the Commission agreed that those aspects of JCS 1998/13 which were of interest to the Commission were generally satisfactory. Accordingly, ownership of all fixed installations at the Atoll, except for several on Eniwetok Island, is in the AEC by purchase. The identity of the fixed installations at Eniwetok Island which belong to the Department of Defense is not outlined in any of the policy references but is contained in the detailed property records at Los Alamos. Similarly, ownership, of movable equipment such as boats, vehicles, and handling equipment remains with the respective purchasers of that equipment. Responsibility for maintenance of installations or equipment lies with the owner thereof, except under special conditions established by JCS 1998/13 or in the Annexes hereto. In summary, general responsibilities for maintenance are:

(1) AEC - All fixed installations on all islands (except Eniwetok) such as roads, power plants and distribution systems, distillation plants, instrument stations, and buildings, but specifically excepting the communications system which is operated and maintained by the Military. All movable equipment such as vehicles, handling equipment, and boats owned, leased, or borrowed by the AEC, but specifically excepting aircraft.

(2) Military - All military vehicles, under military control, including boats, aircraft, and equipment, both in use and in storage.

(3) Eniwetok Island - Is the subject of a special agreement (Appendix "A").

b. Control of Land Areas.

(1) Ownership. Following Presidential approval of SANDSTONE plan on 25 November 1947, the AEC initiated correspondence with the Navy Department's Bureau of Yards and Docks which had been designated by mutual agreement to represent the Commission in any action

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to obtain title. In the course of this correspondence and subsequent meetings the Bureau of Yards and Docks took the position that the Commission should seek out and pay the natives of Eniwetok for the land area of the Atoll of which they were the historic owners until their removal in December 1947. The total cost to the AEC was estimated by Bureau of Yards and Docks at \$515,360. The AEC, on the other hand, took and holds the position that payment to landowners should be made only following proper establishment of claims against the Commission based on land ownership. As of this date, no such claims have been asserted against the Commission, nor is it now anticipated that any will be.

(2) Jurisdiction. The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (which includes Eniwetok Atoll) was placed under the trusteeship system established by the Charter of the United Nations, by means of a trusteeship agreement approved by the Security Council of the United Nations on April 2, 1947, and by the United States Government on July 18, 1947, after due constitutional process. Under the terms of the trusteeship agreement the United States was designated as administering authority of the Trust Territory and the United States has assumed the obligations for the government thereof. Authority and responsibility for the civil administration of the Trust Territory was delegated on July 18, 1947, to the Secretary of the Navy on an interim basis by Executive Order. The President approved the SANDSTONE operation on 25 November 1947 and on 2 December 1947 the Representative of the United States informed the President of the Security Council of the United Nations that pursuant to the trusteeship agreement the territorial waters surrounding the Eniwetok Atoll were closed for security reasons in order that the United States Government may conduct necessary experiments relating to nuclear fission. On July 1, 1951, responsibility for the civil administration of the Trust Territory was transferred to the Secretary of the Interior by Executive Order. Accordingly, the question was asked of the Secretary of the Interior, by AEC, on 17 May 1951 as to what effect, if any, this transfer of administration would have on the position of the AEC in the Trust Territory. The Department of Interior replied in substance that the transfer would have no effect whatsoever on the AEC's position and that they would do everything they could to maintain conditions satisfactory to the Commission's program there. Further, they said that, though they saw no need to formalize the arrangements with respect to Eniwetok, they would be glad to work out an interdepartmental agreement on the matter if we desired. In the course of informal discussions, it was made clear that acquisition of a fee simple title by the AEC was unrealistic under the circumstances. After due consideration, the AEC accepted this arrangement and stated on June 8, 1951, that no formalization appeared to be necessary.

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6. Present Status of Roll-up and Inactivation

a. Organization: The three major subordinate agencies of the AEC and the Department of Defense now involved in operations at Eniwetok are CinCPac, JTF-3, and the Santa Fe Operations, whose areas of operation are divided as follows:

(1) CinCPac - has been given the responsibility by the JCS, through the Chief of Naval Operations, for general area security and logistic support of Eniwetok. The Atoll Commander, Eniwetok, operates under CinCPac as his local representative and reports to him on these two subjects. The Atoll Commander is also Commander of the Army Task Group (TG 3.2) under Commander, JTF-3.

(2) JTF-3 - conducted Operation GREENHOUSE under the Executive Agency of the Department of the Air Force. Its various outstanding projects and responsibilities have been completed, or delegated to other agencies by mutual agreement, so that JTF-3 has discharged all its responsibilities as of 1 August 1951. The JCS have been asked to inactivate JTF-3 effective 30 September 1951. Atomic Energy Commission concurrence has been asked and given, Santa Fe Operations having indicated no objection.

JTF-3 was succeeded on 1 August 1951 by JTF-132, activated 9 July 1951, by the new Executive Agent, Department of the Army. Major General Percy W. Clarkson, USA has been designated Commander. The establishment of the new task force results from the JCS decision referred to above to establish a new Joint Task Force for each extra-continental atomic weapons test and to rotate the executive agency for direction of these tests between the three Services. It is understood that General Hull recommended Major General Clarkson to be Commander, JTF-132, purely on the basis of the latter's extensive experience in commanding Joint Task Forces. He commanded the Thirty-Third Infantry Division during its joint operations in the Pacific during World War II, and later commanded one of the two opposing forces in each of the combined operations PORTREX and SWARMER.

The C-JTF-3 is, and C-JTF-132 will continue to be, represented on the Atoll by the Commander of his Army Task Group (3.2 or 132.2). This Task Group consists of about 380 men from all three Services. With the exception of JTF-132 Headquarters, this will be the only active echelon of JTF-132 until the buildup for the next test is started. Commander, Task Group 132.2, will report to C-JTF-132 on such matters as military administration, internal security of the Atoll, stevedoring, in which he assists the AEC contractor on a pro-rata basis, maintenance of military equipment, support of the Loran station, operation of the military boat pool, and other purely military tasks which are the responsibility of the Joint Task Force.

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(3) AEC - is represented through the Santa Fe Operations by its contractors (Holmes and Narver) who discharge the AEC's responsibilities for roll-up and maintenance, under the local direction of the AEC's Resident Engineer. Holmes and Narver had 495 employees on the site July 1, 1951, scheduled to be reduced to 230 by November 1, 1951.

b. Roll-up & Maintenance Operations:

(1) As of July 20, 1951, roll-up at the Atoll was about 80 percent complete and the estimated date of actual completion was about October 1, 1951. All that remained to be done at that time was to complete the moth-balling of vehicles and movable equipment and the demolition of remaining damaged test structures. The latter will be the final operation of the roll-up since residual radioactivity must be allowed to subside before crews can work for long periods in the shot areas. This radioactivity is being somewhat reduced by bulldozing surface dirt away from shot areas.

(2) As to continuing responsibilities of JTF-3, arrangements are being made to leave military personnel of the Scientific Task Group (3.1) on duty with LASL until their various projects and reports are finished. Money for their travel in this connection is being provided by JTF-3.

(3) The unclassified documentary film and the classified Commander's Report film are to be completed by Lookout Mountain Laboratory. The Division of Information Services will supervise the completion of the documentary film, while the Commander, JTF-3 will supervise distribution of his technical report film.

(4) Classified reports are now being printed by the Government Printing Office and will be distributed according to distribution lists now being prepared. The Air Force has agreed to close out JTF-3 fiscal and funding responsibilities.

(5) The details of roll-up are summarized in the over-all report prepared by C-JTF-3 on Operation GREENHOUSE, delivered to the AEC and the JCS about 1 August 1951.

c. Roll-up and Maintenance Budget: The SFO budget estimate (as of 17 May 1951, revised) contains the following provisions for roll-up and maintenance at Eniwetok during Fiscal Years 1951 and 1952, based on having a test at Eniwetok in the Spring of 1952:

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<u>Supporting Services</u>	<u>FY 1951</u>	<u>FY 1952</u>	<u>FY 1953</u>
	10,017,585	7,045,000	7,045,000
Support - pool labor		1,100,000	
Roll-up			
Clean-up & store construction equipment		212,000	
Clean-up and store marine equipment		53,000	
Warehouse excess construction materials		136,000	
Clean-up generators, stills, pumps		39,000	
General Clean-up, all sites		123,000	
Protective maintenance, buildings and structures		<u>192,000</u>	
Total Roll-Up		755,000	
Maintenance		950,000	
General Services			
Administration		325,000	
Warehouse		317,000	
Fiscal		195,000	
Engineering		94,000	
Marine operations		551,000	
Marine repair		330,000	
Mechanical shops		504,000	
Distillation and power		460,000	
Camp services (Net)		<u>1,464,000</u>	
Total General Services		4,240,000	
Total Supporting Services		7,045,000	

7. Organization for Test Operations

a. GREENHOUSE:

(1) Over-all Atomic Energy Commission Representative - for the Overseas operational phase of GREENHOUSE was Commander, JTF-3, so designated by the AEC on February 13, 1951. This responsibility was separate from, and in addition to, his duties as Task Force Commander. In this capacity, he directed the operations of Commission and contractor personnel as well as the military personnel of the Task Force. This type of delegation of authority by the Commission to successive Task Force Commanders for overseas operations in the future is contemplated in the Commission's acceptance of the JCS' proposal of April 13, 1951 (AEC 324/6 and AEC 334/7) concerning organization for future test operations. It was stated in that proposal that the Joint Task Force Commander was specifically charged with, among other duties, "acting as an agent for the AEC for the exercise of such functions on behalf of the Commission as the latter may deem necessary."

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A second specific responsibility of the Commander was stated as that of exercising "technical responsibility for all phases of the operation." Two schools of thought were debated with respect to accepting this statement of his responsibilities concerning "technical responsibility." One was to outline specifically and in detail the limitations of his technical control over the scientific program, and to state that this control over the technical program was up to, but short of, the point where he could overrule the Scientific Director on technical matters. The other school of thought was that the Department of Defense recognizes the fact that primary responsibility for the technical program must lie with the AEC, although auxiliary technical projects may be added, and that the basic directive from the JCS to the Joint Task Force Commander must hold him responsible for executing the AEC part of the technical program, subject to the advice of the Scientific Director. Implicit in this thought is the fact that the Scientific Director has the right, and in fact the responsibility, to present to the Commission for correction any deviations from the technical plan, insisted upon by the Joint Task Force Commander against his advice, which appear to him to be material. Although the first solution would have been operationally more direct, it is evident that to set up a relationship where the Commander is subject to the direction of one of his subordinates would be awkward. For this reason, and since the Commission can in this regard direct the actions of the Joint Task Force Commander (its over-all representative during overseas phases) or even in the last analysis go to the JCS to require him to execute its desires, if that should become necessary, the statements were accepted as indicated in the letter to the Military Liaison Committee (see AEC 334/7).

(2) AEC Scientific Director - Responsibility for the development of Eniwetok Proving Ground lay initially with the Manager, Santa Fe Operations, who redelegate that responsibility to the J-Division Leader, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, in view of the latter's previous experience on overseas operations with JTF-7. The J-Division Leader later was designated as the AEC Scientific Director for Operation GREENHOUSE. Later, he was also assigned a position by the Commander, JTF-3, in the military organization as Deputy Commander, JTF-3, and Commander, Task Group 3.1 (Scientific Task Group). In this position, he in fact "commanded" all the scientific personnel, both military and civilian, of the Task Force, as well as AEC construction forces. Though operationally desirable, this had the undesirable effect of imposing on the Scientific Director much semi-military, or actual military administration to the detriment of his scientific activities.

Also, while control of the Atomic Energy Commission technical program by a Scientific Director, as stipulated in AEC 334/7, is considered proper and

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workable, the reversal of roles between management (SFO) and contractor (LASL), with consequent direction of AEC agencies charged with support of the operation by its Commission contractor, is not believed to have been a good working arrangement in principle. Simply, responsibility should accompany authority; in this case, the Scientific Director in fact authorized construction and administrative operations for which LASL had not budgeted and for which LASL was not ultimately responsible. These two problems, administrative overload of the Scientific Director and inversion of normal AEC command relationships, should be largely removed by organizational changes proposed below for future tests, both overseas and within the continental limits.

b. Future Tests:

(1) It is evident that full-scale atomic weapons tests will be carried out as long as new or improved weapons continue to be developed. Planning for organization of those tests, therefore, must be long-range and must incorporate in succeeding plans the lessons learned in preceding tests. To this end, key information relative to our organization for GREENHOUSE, already containing the benefit of SANDSTONE experience, is being summarized and consolidated into a concise form for ready incorporation into plans for future operations.

(2) Some of the specific changes resulting from GREENHOUSE experience which will be considered in planning for future tests are:

(a) Basic framework of GREENHOUSE organization has proved generally sound and can again be employed. Within that framework, however, future functional responsibilities should be divided according to normal Commission-Contractor relationships. Responsibility for direction of the Atomic Energy Commission's effort should remain within the AEC organization, probably with the field staff of the Manager, SFO, without redelegation to a contractor. This includes basic responsibility for general AEC administration, support, control of funds, and inspection of the performance of the Commission's various contractors. Control and direction of the scientific program should remain with the Commission's scientific contractors, i.e. with the Scientific Director acting on the staff of the Test Commander. By this arrangement the Scientific Director is relieved of many of the administrative burdens which have plagued him in the past and can devote his time to purely scientific matters. Time-consuming administrative work extraneous to scientific objectives should be handled by the SFO staff just as they are at the home station. This also means that the SFO organization can move into the field for operations with no major dislocations of the command, using administrative, security, operations, or supply channels which exist at the home station. Recognizing the basic difference that the military occupies a supporting,

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rather than directing, position in tests at the Nevada Test Site, this same type of organization also is applicable for continental tests. In short, continuity of organization is achieved both at Los Alamos and during field operations.

(b) The post of Inspector on the field test staff of the Manager, SFO, might well be established. This office could act in all fields of interest and report directly to the Manager, SFO, on matters of contract execution, security, economy of expenditures, deficiencies of organization, and similar matters which are of essential interest to management.

(c) Each broad experimental program or activity in the future should have its own Deputy Test Director to represent the program sponsor (Department of Defense, Federal Civil Defense Administration, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory), while the Commission's Scientific Director acts in general control of the Scientific Program, supervising the individual Deputy Scientific Directors. This puts each program under the direct control of a scientist with direct interest in, and knowledge of, the results to be obtained, but keeps the over-all direction and arbitration under a man responsible to the Commission.

(d) In connection with funding future tests, we should insist on thoroughly detailed agreements as to what agency is to bear each specific part of costs for equipment, labor, and services, including initial, operating, maintenance, and roll-up costs. This has been pointed up by difficulties arising from GREENHOUSE despite what were originally considered to have been detailed arrangements.

c. Budgeting for Future Tests: Since requirements for future tests are seldom clear in detail far enough in advance to permit including thoroughly accurate figures in budget estimates made up a long time before expenditure date, it is evident that budget estimates for future tests are by nature very tentative. Also, it is our feeling that advance budgeting must be done so as to provide for the maximum foreseeable contingencies, with the thought that moneys not required in the end can at any time be redirected. Today the feasibility of, or requirement for, a Spring, 1952, thermonuclear test at Eniwetok is not clear. For the above reasons, however, DMA has assumed in making up their test budget that there will be a Continental test in Fall, 1951, and a test at Eniwetok in Spring, 1952. Should program developments not permit a Spring, 1952, thermonuclear experiment, it will be necessary to proceed with another Continental test in 1952. Funds originally budgeted for a Spring, 1952, test at Eniwetok will be available for redirection to this program. In this case, also, Maintenance funds budgeted at a higher level to provide

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for operating the Eniwetok base installations during a test period will become available for possible redirection to the Nevada Test Site. The Test Budget is itemized in Appendix "C".

LIST OF ENCLOSURES

APPENDIX "A"

Memorandum of Agreement for Maintenance, Eniwetok Island

APPENDIX "B"

JTF-3 Fiscal and Accounting Principles

APPENDIX "C"

Test Budget

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APPENDIX "A"

ANNEX "B" TO ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 3 16 MAY 1951

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT FOR MAINTENANCE, ENIWETOK ISLAND

1. A meeting was held at Headquarters, Joint Task Force THREE, 26 April 1951 for the purpose of reaching an understanding in detail as to the maintenance responsibilities on Eniwetok Island during the Post-GREENHOUSE period. The following persons were present.

Mr. Paul W. Spain	Task Group 3.1, AEC
Lt. Col. Charles W. Youngman	Task Group 3.2
Major Bruce D. Jones	J-4 Div. JTF-3
Major James J. Finn	Task Group 3.2

2. Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, USAF, subject "Basic Assumptions for Roll-up Planning" formed the basis for the discussion. Under para 1 c it is stated "the Atomic Energy Commission will assume responsibility for the operation of all basic utilities and the maintenance of all fixed facilities at Eniwetok. The Armed Forces will be responsible for military operations including communications, security, care of military equipment in use by the Armed Forces or in storage, weather, liaison airlift and logistic support of Armed Forces activities." Accordingly, the following detailed agreements were reached and are confirmed by the signatories.

a. Power. The AEC will operate, maintain and repair the power system from the production through the distribution and interior wiring, and will rewire auxiliary systems now being supplied by auxiliary units so as to tie-in essential needs to the main island systems, standby units in use will be operated by the user who will perform minor maintenance. All other maintenance and repair will be performed by the AEC.

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b. Water. The AEC will operate, maintain and repair the water systems from intake, through pumping stations, distillation units, storage, distribution and interior plumbing. The installed Badger distillation units will remain in place and will be initially "pickled" by the Armed Forces. AEC will be responsible for the maintenance of these units.

c. Sewerage. The AEC will maintain and repair the sewerage system including interior plumbing and sewer outfalls.

d. POL. The Armed Forces will operate the POL farm. The AEC will perform maintenance and repair of the POL system including the lines to the fueling buoys.

e. Refrigeration. The AEC will operate, maintain and repair the refrigeration facilities to include the temperature control, reefers and ice-making units. Reefer trailers will be placed in dead storage by the Armed Forces. No maintenance will be performed on the old obsolete "SANDSTONE" reefers.

f. Airfield. The AEC will maintain the airfield in a satisfactory operational condition, and perform such repairs as are necessary to prevent major deterioration.

g. Buildings. The AEC will perform maintenance and repair of all buildings. Prior to turning over maintenance responsibilities to the AEC, the Armed Forces will perform such preventive maintenance as is practicable to buildings and tent frames, and will close-up and secure those buildings that will not be in use.

h. Roads and Grounds. The AEC will maintain and repair all roads and grounds. Each agency will be responsible for the police of the area around its own installations. The Armed Forces will provide such small tools as they may need for policing.

3. The AEC will procure such materials and parts as are needed in connection with its responsibilities. The mutual

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responsibilities for adjustments of contributed costs of the operation will be the subject of a separate agreement. Each party will maintain adequate accounting required by such agreements.

4. Installed property of the Armed Forces with the exception of communications equipment will be furnished to the AEC in accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws, regulations or directives governing the Armed Forces. The AEC will maintain this property.

5. Heavy equipment of the Armed Forces now on loan to AEC will be returned as soon as possible for further shipment.

6. Responsibility for all maintenance of fixed facilities will be assumed by AEC 10 June 1951.

APPROVED: /s/ Paul W. Spain
PAUL W. SPAIN
Resident Engineer
Santa Fe Operations Office
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission

APPROVED: /s/ E. R. Quesada
E. R. QUESADA,
Lt. Gen.
Commanding
Joint Task Force
Three

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APPENDIX "B"

JTF-3
FISCAL AND ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES

A. ALLOCATION OF COSTS

It is proposed that commencing 1 January 1950, the costs incurred in connection with construction of the Proving Ground at Eniwetok Atoll and operations of Joint Task Force THREE be borne as follows:

1. In general, the Atomic Energy Commission will bear all costs of construction of facilities at Eniwetok Atoll which are required by the AEC and all costs of AEC activities connected with proving-ground operations. Similarly, the Department of Defense will bear all costs of its activities connected with proving-ground operations. Within the Department of Defense, all operational costs, in excess of normal operating costs, incurred by the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force in support of JTF-3 will be borne by operating funds made available to the CJTF-3. The allocation of major costs arising from future projects not covered by this agreement will be the subject of further agreements between the AEC and the Department of Defense.

2. The following are examples of the costs to be charged to the AEC:

a. Except as otherwise provided herein, the cost of construction of facilities on islands of Eniwetok Atoll (exclusive of equipment) where the construction is of primary interest to the AEC. In connection with this construction, such equipment as is made available from armed forces stock will be furnished by the armed forces as provided hereinbelow.

b. Except as otherwise provided herein, the cost of construction materials required for agreed construction of facilities on Eniwetok Island and the cost of maintenance of the semi-permanent facilities within the atoll.

c. Cost of all equipment, supplies, and material purchased by the Department of Defense at the specific request of the AEC.

d. Costs connected with the modification of material and equipment when such modifications are made at the request of the AEC.

e. Cost of operating and maintaining military equipment provided for the use of the AEC and its contractors.

f. Cost of expendable supplies furnished the AEC from military stocks.

g. All normal AEC administrative expenses, including salaries, subsistence, per diem, travel, etc., of civilian personnel employed or contracted for by the AEC in connection with the project, except that militarily controlled transportation to and from Z/I, will be provided by the Department of Defense.

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h. All costs of experimental projects of primary interest to the AEC.

i. Packing, handling and crating charges and cost of commercial transportation within the Z/I on AEC material and equipment and on Department of Defense material and equipment requested by the AEC.

j. Cost of travel and per diem of all military personnel assigned to AEC projects.

3. The following are examples of the costs to be charged to the Department of Defense:

a. The cost of all equipment, materials, and supplies furnished by the Department of Defense, except for the equipment, materials and supplies purchased at the specific request of the AEC and expendable supplies furnished AEC from military stocks.

b. Transportation (by military-controlled transportation) of all personnel, equipment, materials and supplies, except as provided in paragraphs 2 g and j above.

c. Operations of all Departments of Defense components assigned to or in support of Joint Task Force THREE.

d. Pay, subsistence, travel and per diem of personnel, both civilian and military, employed by the Department of Defense, except as provided in paragraphs 2 g and j above.

e. All costs of technical scientific or other activities of primary interest to the Department of Defense.

4. Costs of projects of mutual interest to two or more participants will be prorated in proportion to the degrees of interest. The decisions for the interpretation or allocation of specific costs, in accordance with the above agreement, will be the responsibility of the Commander, JTF-3.

B. COST REPORTING PRINCIPLES

1. The Commander, Joint Task Force THREE shall specify the projects and subprojects for which cost data are required.

2. The projects and subprojects will be clearly defined so that the costing can be utilized by the Commander, Joint Task Force THREE.

3. The cost data to be furnished by AEC and the three participating military departments will be based on uniform principles established by the Commander, Joint Task Force THREE.

4. Each agency or department will report monthly all capital and operating costs by projects and subprojects. Each of the participating agencies or departments will submit their cost data, in prescribed form, to a central agency to be designated by the Commander, Joint Task Force three so that a consolidated report can be made therefrom.

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C. FUNDING PRINCIPLES

1. For the purpose of facilitating the most economical and efficient operation of JTF-3, funding will be accomplished under the Air Force Management Fund, pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 216, 81st Congress, under such regulations as will be prescribed by the Secretary of Defense. Funding responsibility for this project will be assigned to the Joint Task Force Commander.

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ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

"TEST BUDGET"

	<u>General Planning</u>		<u>Nevada Test Site</u>		<u>Eniwetok Proving Ground</u>		<u>Totals</u>	
	<u>FY 1952</u>	<u>FY 1953</u>	<u>FY 1952</u>	<u>FY 1953</u>	<u>FY 1952</u>	<u>FY 1953</u>	<u>FY 1952</u>	<u>FY 1953</u>
General Planning	2,592,300	2,378,900	-	-	-	-	2,592,300	2,378,900
Scientific Tests	-	-	4,223,300	3,388,000	11,049,500	10,587,500	15,272,800	13,975,500
Supporting Services	-	-	1,250,000	1,548,600	7,045,000	7,099,900	8,295,000	8,648,500
TOTALS	-	-	5,473,300	4,936,600	18,094,500	17,687,400	26,160,100	25,002,900